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Note
Embracing Ambiguity and Adopting Propriety:
Using Comparative Law To Explore Avenues for
Protecting the LGBT Population Under Article 7
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court
Charles Barrera Moore
In recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in the
attention afforded to persecution of identity-based groups within the international human rights context. Most notably, per1
haps, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(“Rome Statute”) was seen as a crucial step by the international
community in creating a mechanism by which offenders of hu2
man rights would be punished. The Rome Statute was consid J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Minnesota Law School. I would
like to thank Professor Christopher N.J. Roberts for his guidance throughout
the entire research and writing process. Additionally, I thank Professors Valerie Oosterveld and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin for helpful comments, and classmate
Brian Gerd for providing a great sounding board while formulating my thesis.
Lastly, I would like to thank Amanda McAllister for her invaluable edits and
the Minnesota Law Review for their work on my piece. All errors are my own.
Copyright © 2017 by Charles Barrera Moore.
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37
I.L.M. 1002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
2. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal
Court: Some Preliminary Reflections, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 144, 145 (1999)
(“[T]he ICC could mark a real turning point in the world community . . . [and]
the ICC [is] a significant building block in the construction of a truly international legal community.”); Marlies Glasius, Expertise in the Cause of Justice:
Global Civil Society Influence on the Statute for an International Criminal
Court, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 2002, at 137 (Marlies Glasius et al. eds.,
2002) (“[T]he International Criminal Court . . . will be an important step in the
ongoing transition towards an international legal order that is less based on
state sovereignty and more oriented towards the protection of all citizens of
the world from abuse of power.”); Philippe Kirsch, The Role of the International Criminal Court in Enforcing International Criminal Law, 22 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 539, 540–41 (2007) (“For experts on human rights it is clear that the protection of individuals from violations of human rights and humanitarian law
requires appropriate mechanisms to enforce the law. . . . Eventually, a perma-
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ered especially progressive in its treatment of gender-based
crimes, both in recognizing that they could be committed in
times of peace as crimes against humanity and by expanding
the list of gender-based acts that would constitute a crime
3
against humanity. Aside from serving merely as evidence of international recognition of human rights, the establishment of
the International Criminal Court (ICC) demonstrated a willingness by the international community as a whole to protect
4
those whose rights had been violated.
To date, however, this growing recognition of the need to
hold human rights violators criminally liable in the ICC has
not yet extended to those that persecute on the basis of sexual
orientation. Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute provides the criteria for crimes against humanity and seems to offer the most
logical avenue towards prosecuting those who persecute members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
5
community. It states that persecution “against any identifiable
group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds
6
that are universally recognized” can be prosecuted. Yet, “gender” is defined in the following way: “the two sexes, male and
female, within the context of society. The term ‘gender’ does not

nent truly international court was necessary to respond to the most serious
international crimes and to overcome the limitations of the ad hoc tribunals.”).
3. See THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, POLICY
PAPER ON SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED CRIMES 9 (2014), https://www.icc-cpi
.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Policy-Paper-on-Sexual-and-Gender-Based-Crimes--June
-2014.pdf (“Over the past few decades, the international community has taken
many concrete steps in response to increasing calls to recognise sexual and
gender-based crimes as serious crimes nationally and internationally. . . . At
the Rome Conference, States agreed upon explicit provisions in the Statute of
the ICC, recognising various forms of sexual and gender-based crimes as
amongst the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.
The Statute is the first instrument in international law to include an expansive list of sexual and gender-based crimes as war crimes relating to both international and non-international armed conflict.” (citations omitted)).
4. The Preamble of the Rome Statute acknowledges as much, stating
that parties to the treaty were “[m]indful that . . . millions of children, women
and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the
conscience of humanity” and were “[d]etermine[d] to put an end to impunity
for the perpetrators of these crimes.” Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl.
5. Classifying widespread attacks against homosexuals as acts of genocide could certainly serve as a route towards prosecution; however, it has been
made clear that the LGBT community is not a group against which genocide
can be committed. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
6. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(h) (emphasis added).
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indicate any meaning different from the above.” This confound8
ing definition has been criticized at length and as long as it
remains unaddressed, the uncertainty about whether or not
persecution on the basis of sexual orientation can be brought in
front of the ICC will remain. Without action from the Office of
the Prosecutor (OTP) clarifying the definition, it is unlikely
that any case will be brought in front of the ICC seeking to
prosecute persecutors of the LGBT community and those criminals will continue to act outside of the law. This result is entirely unacceptable not only for the body of international human rights law as a whole but also for the ICC, which has
made a commitment to “put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes” and “guarantee lasting respect for and
9
the enforcement of international justice.”
This is a current reality that the international community
must confront. In Kenya, private mobs have attacked the LGBT
community, and in Egypt, the government has likewise target10
ed its LGBT citizens in a series of arrests and police raids.
Further, as of 2014, there were thirty-seven signatories to the
11
Rome Statute that criminalize homosexuality.
The ICC has a unique ability to bring in many states that
are situated in regions where domestic courts are either unable
12
to or reluctant to prosecute. Therefore, the ICC needs to act in
situations where there have been direct, persecutory actions
against members of the LGBT community by the government
13
or by private parties. While some countries, when adopting
7. Id. art. 7(3).
8. See infra Part I.C.2.
9. Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl.
10. See infra Part I.A.
11. See Michael Bohlander, Criminalising LGBT Persons Under National
Criminal Law and Article 7(1)(h) and (3) of the ICC Statute, 5 GLOBAL POL’Y
401, 408 (2014).
12. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(a).
13. Additionally, the time is ripe for discussing expanding the scope of
criminals the ICC is willing to prosecute. The ICC opened its first case in September 2009 and is thus still formulating its precedents. See Daniel Donovan,
International Criminal Court: Successes and Failures, INT’L POL’Y DIG. (Mar.
23, 2012), http://www.intpolicydigest.org/2012/03/23/international-criminal
-court-successes-and-failures (discussing early operations of the ICC). Also,
the ICC has had a limited scope geographically as it has only addressed situations on the continent of Africa. Situations Under Investigation, INT’L CRIM.
CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx (last visited Nov. 28, 2016)
(indicating that formal investigations have been opened against individuals in
the following states: Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Georgia, Mali, Sudan, Libya, Kenya, and Côte d’Ivoire).
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the provisions of the Rome Statute, have explicitly included
14
sexual orientation as a protected ground, many need international intervention and pressure to bring these criminals to jus15
tice. The interpretation of “gender” is left to the ICC and, as
OTP brings cases in front of the ICC, it has a great deal of power and discretion in framing and guiding which offenses are in16
vestigated and prosecuted. Yet, without action from either the
ICC or domestic jurisdictions that have so far failed to act,
those actors who have enjoyed impunity for crimes will likely
continue to do so.
This Note argues that, in its current construction, the definition of “gender” found in Article 7 of the Rome Statute should
include protection of the LGBT community. The debate that
surrounded this contentious definition during the negotiations
of the Rome Statute has followed it through the early years of
17
the ICC, but that ambiguity does not preclude protection of
this vulnerable group. Because of the infant nature of the
18
ICC, it is appropriate that, in developing its jurisprudence,
the ICC look to human rights courts that have encountered
The Office of the Prosecutor has begun preliminary investigations in many
countries outside of the African continent, but has not moved those cases to a
formal investigation or prosecution stage. See Preliminary Examinations,
INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/preliminary-examinations.aspx
(last visited Nov. 28, 2016). Therefore, if ever there were a time to expand the
scope of the prosecutors’ reach, a time when the ICC is still in its infancy and
has yet to reach other parts of the world would seem to be ideal.
14. See, e.g., An Act Defining and Penalizing Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity, Organizing Jurisdiction, Designating Special Courts, and for Related Purposes, Rep.
Act No. 9851, § 6(h), 106:9 O.G. 1120 (July 27, 2009) (Phil.) (“For the purpose
of this act, ‘other crimes against humanity’ means any of the following acts
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: . . . Persecution against
any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, sexual orientation or other grounds . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
15. See Valerie Oosterveld, The Definition of “Gender” in the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court: A Step Forward or Back for International
Criminal Justice?, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 55, 82 (2005) (“Since the interpretation of ‘gender’ is left with the ICC itself, there are very real concerns by many
commentators that the ICC will choose a narrow and regressive reading of the
‘gender’ definition.”).
16. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97
AM. J. INT’L L. 510, 510 (2003) (identifying the important political and legal
role of OTP in its ability to determine what cases are brought to the ICC).
17. See infra Part I.C.
18. See infra Part I.B.2.
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cases involving members of the LGBT community. Of particular importance, this Note explores the ways human rights
courts, namely the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR), have protected the rights of the LGBT community
and discusses how those approaches could be utilized by the
ICC. OTP has made signals that it is moving in this direction,
but it needs to act decisively to end the debate altogether.
While several other authors have identified the shortcomings of
the Rome Statute’s definition of “gender,” this Note analyzes
decisions by human rights courts and imports those teachings
in the context of the ICC. By looking at these decisions, the ICC
can utilize the tools it already has in place to prosecute offenders of LGBT rights. In order to solidify such an understanding
of the Rome Statute’s definition of “gender,” the OTP, as the
body that brings cases in front of the ICC, should clarify the
definition to cover cases involving persecution of LGBT individuals. An exploration of the legislative history, the flexibility
maintained by the statutory language, and the practice of human rights courts all suggest this is the proper conclusion.
Part I begins by establishing that the Rome Statute has
failed to protect the LGBT community and details the legislative history that led to the current definition. This discussion is
crucial in demonstrating that the definition of “gender” maintains flexibility while other provisions of the treaty are likely
unable to protect the LGBT community from persecution. Part
I concludes by discussing the work done by international human rights courts to protect the rights of the LGBT population
and developments in the international community. Part II addresses the flexibility of the term “gender” under the Rome
Statute, rejecting the arguments some have proffered that the
definition denies protection of the LGBT community, and discusses the opportunity for embracing the openness of such a
formulation. Finally, Part II establishes that, even though the
roles of human rights courts and criminal courts may differ
slightly, lessons from human rights courts can be applied directly in the context of the ICC. Last, Part III applies lessons
from the ECHR and the IACHR to demonstrate how the ICC
could act similarly to bring to justice criminals who have persecuted the LGBT community. This Part also explores developments in the international legal community and in human

19. See infra Part II.C.
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rights courts to establish that OTP should promulgate a policy
that explicitly states that the LGBT community is considered
part of the Rome Statute’s definition of “gender.” The Note concludes by proposing specific language that could be adopted by
OTP to support the ICC’s obligations to uphold international
human rights and protect those who have been systematically
targeted by criminals.
I. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ROME STATUTE, THE
DEFINITION OF “GENDER,” AND THE PRACTICES OF
HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS
In order to proceed, it is crucial to understand that the
LGBT community is in fact a group that is currently persecuted, that the ICC has the tools to bring such criminals under its
jurisdiction, and that using Article 7’s utilization of “gender” as
the basis for protection provides the best avenue towards prosecution. Section A shows that the LGBT community is one that
is in need of protection from the ICC. Section B lays out the
language employed by the Rome Statute and describes how
that language has been utilized. By analyzing the language
found within the Rome Statute and how that language came to
be, Section C discusses the ongoing debate over the definition’s
protection of the LGBT community. Next, Section D analyzes
the elements needed to prosecute under Article 7 of the Rome
Statute in order to demonstrate that the only element missing
from prosecuting these crimes is whether or not the LGBT
community fits under one of the protected grounds. Although at
first glance it may appear the LGBT community would be protected as a “universally recognized” group, Section E explores
why that may not be so, leaving gender as the only means under which these crimes can be prosecuted. Last, Section F analyzes how international human rights courts specifically and
the international community generally have understood the
rights of members of the LGBT community.
A. PERSECUTION OF THE LGBT COMMUNITY BY SIGNATORIES TO
THE ROME STATUTE
There are currently groups of individuals who are persecuted because of their membership in the LGBT community
and their respective countries’ views of that group. These attacks often come from private individuals who the government
has been unwilling or unable to control; yet, some of the persecution originates from governments themselves. The ICC was
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designed to protect human rights in both instances. The following situations are recent examples of persecutory treatment
in countries who have signed the Rome Statute.
In Kenya, mobs have directed attacks at individuals “based
21
on their sexual orientation and gender identity.” Although
private individuals, and not the state, committed these acts,
the government of Kenya is complicit in that it has refused to
22
take action to prosecute these individuals. One notable instance in Kenya involved a group of approximately 200 people
attacking gay and bisexual men and transgendered women who
worked as peer educators at an HIV clinic after rumors of a gay
23
wedding circulated in February 2010. The victims of these attacks recounted being burned and beaten by the mob and later,
once in the safety of the police station, the mob threatened to
24
burn down the building. These victims are not only subjected
to these attacks but must continue to live in countries where
groups, which at times take the form of mobs, harbor these feelings towards the LGBT community. Attacks such as these are
prime examples of cases in which the ICC has jurisdiction to
prosecute under its Article 17 powers as the local government
is either “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the inves25
tigation or prosecution.”
There have also been instances in which the government of
a specific signatory state has been an active participant in the
persecution of the local LGBT population. For example, the
Egyptian government has arrested members of the LGBT
community as a way to distract its citizens from other domestic
26
problems. It is not illegal to be either gay or transgendered in
20. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(a) (“[T]he [ICC] shall determine that a case is inadmissible where . . . [t]he case is being investigated
or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out the investigation or prosecution . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
21. Kenya: Pervasive Homophobic Violence in Coastal Region, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/28/kenya
-pervasive-homophobic-violence-coastal-region.
22. Id.
23. The Issue Is Violence: Attacks on LGBT People on Kenya’s Coast, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/09/28/issue
-violence/attacks-lgbt-people-kenyas-coast.
24. Id.
25. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17.
26. Peter Montgomery, The Politics of Anti-Gay Persecution, POL. RES.
ASSOCIATES (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.politicalresearch.org/2014/12/19/the
-politics-of-anti-gay-persecution.
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Egypt, yet approximately 150 members of the LGBT community have been arrested and, as of May 2015, about 100 of those
27
individuals remained imprisoned. Recently, the government of
Egypt arrested seven transgendered men for meeting and al28
legedly engaging in “debauchery.” Officials have even conducted raids targeted at gay men; notably, twenty-five men
were arrested in December 2014 during a police raid at a bathhouse in what has been characterized as a crackdown on the
29
gay community. Although these men were ultimately acquit30
ted, there are still others who are convicted under similarly
dubious charges. Judges have reportedly handed down sen31
tences as long as seven years in such cases. Despite the fact
that there is no law banning homosexual activity of any nature
32
in Egypt, “people are usually charged with ‘debauchery’ under
an old law originally intended to combat prostitution. A law
against ‘immoral advertising’ has also been used to entrap men
33
seeking gay partners on the internet.” The government has
engaged in a systematic, widespread, and targeted attack
against these individuals, a situation that seems ripe for ICC
34
investigation and prosecution. Yet, despite this ongoing reality, the ICC has yet to investigate a situation involving the persecution of LGBT individuals.

27. Bel Trew, How Distaste of LGBT People in Egypt Has Turned into
State-Sponsored Persecution, INDEPENDENT (May 17, 2015), http://www
.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/how-distaste-of-lgbt-people-in
-egypt-has-turned-into-state-sponsored-persecution-10256869.html.
28. Id.
29. Patrick Kingsley, Egyptian TV Crew Criticised over Police Raid on
Cairo Bath House, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.theguardian
.com/world/2014/dec/09/egypt-police-raid-cairo-bath-house.
30. Egypt Court Clears 26 Men Held in Raid on ‘Gay Bathhouse,’ INDEPENDENT (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/
egypt-court-clears-26-men-held-in-raid-on-gay-bathhouse-9973769.html.
31. Trew, supra note 27.
32. Id.
33. Brian Whitaker, If Homosexuality Isn’t Illegal, Why Is There a Gay
Crackdown in Egypt?, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www
.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/10/homosexuality-gay-crackdown
-egypt-economic-political-issues?CMP=share_btn_tw.
34. This Note focuses only on the definition of “gender” under the Rome
Statute, but it is important to keep in mind that in order to prosecute the ICC
would have to meet other threshold qualifications. See Part I.D for a short description of those other elements.
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B. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ICC AND THE ROME
STATUTE HAVE BOTH FAILED TO PROTECT THE LGBT
COMMUNITY
This Section elucidates why there is a question over the
definition’s applicability to the LGBT community through an
examination of the language of the Rome Statute in form and
in practice. Subsection 1 describes the functions and operations
of the ICC; Subsection 2 briefly examines the jurisprudence of
this infant court; Subsection 3 explores the language of the
Rome Statute at issue; and Subsection 4 establishes that this
language has not yet been completely understood to protect
members of the LGBT community.
1. Structure of the Rome Statute and the ICC
Drawing on the atrocities that occurred during the twenti35
eth century, namely in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the ICC was
organized with the purpose of prosecuting “the most serious
crimes of international concern” while being solely a “comple36
mentary [entity] to national criminal jurisdictions.” Its structure consists of the court itself and other independent organs
which assist in the functioning of the ICC in general. Of particular importance for this Note, OTP is responsible for reviewing
referrals to the ICC, investigating potential cases, and bringing
37
any appropriate cases in front of the ICC for prosecution.
The ICC functions under certain guidelines, including sev38
eral “general principles of criminal law,” its own rules on ju39
40
risdiction, and “complementarity.” The ICC has the ability to

35. INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMICOURT 3, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf
(last visited Nov. 28, 2016) (“Some of the most heinous crimes were committed
during the conflicts which marked the twentieth century. Unfortunately,
many of these violations of international law have remained unpunished. . . .
The idea of a system of international criminal justice re-emerged after the end
of the Cold War. However, while negotiations on the ICC Statute were underway at the United Nations, the world was witnessing the commission of heinous crimes in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. . . . These events undoubtedly had a most significant impact on the decision to
convene the conference which established the ICC in Rome in the summer of
1998.”).
36. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 1.
37. Id. art. 42(1).
38. Id. pt. 3.
39. Id. pt. 2.
40. Id. art. 1.
NAL
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hear cases in which the defendants are accused of violating one
41
of three crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
42
crimes. The principle of complementarity governs the ICC’s
jurisdiction and its ability to prosecute. Under this doctrine,
“national justice systems have the primary responsibility for
investigating, prosecuting and punishing individuals, in accordance with their national laws, for crimes falling under the
43
jurisdiction of the [ICC].” Only if a state is unwilling or unable
44
to investigate and/or prosecute should the ICC intervene. In
determining whether or not the state has failed to investigate
or prosecute, the ICC ought to consider whether a proceeding in
the country was pursued simply in order to protect the party
rather than prosecute, whether there has been “unjustified delay” in the prosecution that shows there is not a genuine will to
prosecute, and whether the proceedings were conducted “inde45
pendently [and] impartially.” If a country fails to act on a domestic level, the ICC is permitted to take a case without conducting the analysis in Article 17(1)(a)–(c); this analysis need
only be undertaken if the country has taken steps to investi46
gate but has not fully followed through to prosecution. Additionally, if the individual has already been tried or the case
does not present the requisite level of “gravity” of harm, then
47
the ICC ought not investigate and prosecute.
2. Jurisprudential History of the ICC
During the years of operation of the ICC, there have been
48
five cases that have come to a resolution. All five cases involve
41. For a discussion on the crime of genocide, see infra note 64 and accompanying text.
42. “War crimes” is defined by an extensive list of offenses that may be
committed during times of war. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2).
43. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of an Int’l Criminal Court, 9th plen. mtg. at 7, ¶ 53, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/SR.9 (July 17, 1998).
44. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(a).
45. Id. art. 17(2)(a)–(c).
46. JANN K. KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE ROME STATUTE AND
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTIONS 105 (Ruth Mackenzie et al. eds., 2008)
(“In sum, complete inaction on the national level would thus allow the ICC to
take up a case without having to enter into an assessment of the admissibility
criteria in Article 17 (1)(a) to (c). The provisions on complementarity only apply once a State takes, at a minimum, initial investigative steps.”).
47. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(c)–(d).
48. Closed Stage, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/closed
.aspx (last visited Nov. 28, 2016).
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African men accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during armed, political conflict; none have led to
prosecution as each has been cleared of charges, many due to a
49
lack of evidence. Callixte Mbarushimana, Mathieu Ngudjolo
Chui, and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta were all charged with the
crime against humanity of rape under Article 7(1)(g) of the
50
Rome Statute. Chui was also charged with the crime of sexual
51
slavery.
There are currently three cases that are at the trial stage
at the ICC, all involving men from Africa and one of which involving witness tampering in a case at the ICC. Bosco
Ntaganda has been accused of war crimes and crimes against
humanity directed at the non-Hema civilian population in the
52
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Laurent Gbagbo and
Charles Blé Goudé have been charged with murder, rape, attempted murder, and persecution for actions taken in Côte
53
d’Ivoire. Importantly, the ICC has taken up two cases involving individuals charged with gendered crimes committed

49. INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, CASE INFORMATION SHEET: SITUATION IN
DARFUR, SUDAN, THE PROSECUTOR V. BAHAR IDRISS ABU GARDA, ICC-02/0502/09 (2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/abugarda/Documents/AbuGarda
Eng.pdf; INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, CASE INFORMATION SHEET: SITUATION IN THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, THE PROSECUTOR V. CALLIXTE
MBARUSHIMANA, ICC-01/04-01/10 (2012) [hereinafter MBARUSHIMANA],
https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/mbarushimana/Documents/MbarushimanaEng
.pdf; INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, CASE INFORMATION SHEET: SITUATION IN THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, THE PROSECUTOR V. MATHIEU
NGUDJOLO CHUI, ICC-01/04-02/12 (2015) [hereinafter CHUI], https://www.icc
-cpi.int/drc/ngudjolo/Documents/ChuiEng.pdf; INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, CASE
INFORMATION SHEET: SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA, THE PROSECUTOR V. UHURU MUIGAI KENYATTA, ICC-01/09-02/11 (2015) [hereinafter
KENYATTA], https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya/kenyatta/Documents/KenyattaEng
.pdf; INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, CASE INFORMATION SHEET: SITUATION IN THE
REPUBLIC OF KENYA, THE PROSECUTOR V. WILLIAM SAMOEI RUTO AND JOSHUA
ARAP SANG, ICC-01/09-01/11 (2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya/rutosang/
Documents/RutoSangEng.pdf.
50. CHUI, supra note 49, at 1; KENYATTA, supra note 49, at 1;
MBARUSHIMANA, supra note 49, at 1.
51. CHUI, supra note 49, at 1.
52. INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, CASE INFORMATION SHEET: SITUATION IN THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, THE PROSECUTOR V. BOSCO
NTAGANDA, ICC-01/04-02/06 1 (2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/ntaganda/
Documents/NtagandaEng.pdf.
53. INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, CASE INFORMATION SHEET: SITUATION IN
CÔTE D’IVOIRE, THE PROSECUTOR V. LAURENT GBAGBO AND CHARLES BLÉ
GOUDÉ, ICC-02/11-01/15 1–2 (2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/cdi/gbagbo-goude/
Documents/LaurentGbagboandBleGoudeEng.pdf.

1298

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:1287
54

against women belonging to specific ethnic groups. Both cases
are at the pre-trial stage while the subjects of the cases remain
55
at large.
As can be seen by the above, the ICC has had limited opportunities to explore the Rome Statute’s definition of “gender”
and certainly has not had occasion to consider whether the
LGBT community falls within that definition. As will be discussed below, because of the lack of precedents from the ICC
and the uncertainty surrounding the definition of “gender,” it is
appropriate that the ICC consult the practices of international
56
human rights courts.
3. The Pertinent Language of the Rome Statute
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was
57
completed when negotiations finished on July 17, 1998 and
was designed to “establish an independent permanent International Criminal Court in relationship with the [U]nited Nations
system, with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of con58
cern to the international community as a whole.” Currently,
there are 124 countries that are parties to the Rome Statute
59
and thus subject to its provisions. Article 7 of the Rome Statute states that persecution on account of one’s religion, ethnicity, or membership in another “universally recognized” group
60
can be prosecuted. Gender is one of the groups that is protect54. INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, CASE INFORMATION SHEET: SITUATION IN
DARFUR, SUDAN, THE PROSECUTOR V. AHMAD MUHAMMAD HARUN (“AHMAD
HARUN”) AND ALI MUHAMMAD ALI ABD-AL-RAHMAN (“ALI KUSHAYB”), ICC02/05-01/07 (2015) [hereinafter HARUN & KUSHAYB], https://www.icc-cpi.int/
darfur/harunkushayb/Documents/HarunKushaybEng.pdf; INT’L CRIMINAL
COURT, CASE INFORMATION SHEET: SITUATION IN DARFUR, SUDAN, THE PROSECUTOR V. OMAR HASSAN AHMAD AL BASHIR, ICC-02/05-01/09 (2015) [hereinafter AL BASHIR], https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir/Documents/
AlBashirEng.pdf.
55. AL BASHIR, supra note 54, at 1; HARUN & KUSHAYB, supra note 54, at
1.
56. See infra Part II.C.
57. Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 22, 22 (1999).
58. Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl.
59. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icc
-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to
%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited Nov. 28, 2016). Of the 124 signatories, 34 are from Africa, 19 from Asia, 43 from Europe, and 28 from Latin
America and the Caribbean. Id. Notably missing from the list of signatories
are the United States, China, India, and Turkey. Id.
60. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(h).
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ed by this provision, but the Rome Statute refers to Article 7(3),
which defines gender in the following manner: “the two sexes,
male and female, within the context of society. The term ‘gen61
der’ does not indicate any meaning different from the above.”
The “universally recognized” designation indicates that there is
a high standard that must be met in order to even determine
that a social group exists and is thus worthy of protection under the Rome Statute, as compared to other references in the
62
treaty to “internationally recognized” groups or norms.
4. The Lingering Question of “Gender”
On its face, the above language does not seem to cover maltreatment of the LGBT population. The fact that the definition
of “gender” states that it does not “indicate any meaning different from the above” could be understood to mean that it does
63
not refer to mean anything other than male or female. However, while the Rome Statute states that the definition shall
not have any other meaning, the meaning that is extracted
from the definition itself is still quite unclear, while also leaving room for an interpretation that covers the LGBT community.
The ICC has made clear that sexual orientation is not a
64
group that fits under the genocide heading; therefore if prosecution will ever take place, it must be under the Article 7
“crimes against humanity” umbrella. In order to understand
how sexual orientation as a protected group may fit within the
parameters of Article 7, the text and its history must be explored further.

61. Id. art. 7(3).
62. See infra Part I.E.
63. Oosterveld, supra note 15, at 57.
64. The idea of expanding the definition of “genocide” was explicitly considered during the negotiations of the Rome Statute; however, it was decided
that expanding the definition to include other groups would only serve to create controversy. Alycia T. Feindel, Reconciling Sexual Orientation: Creating a
Definition of Genocide That Includes Sexual Orientation, 13 MICH. ST. J. INT’L
L. 197, 213 (2005). The ICC has since made clear that the crime of genocide is
not expanded to any additional groups. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case
No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant
of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ¶ 114 (Mar. 4, 2009) (“The
Majority highlights that the crime of genocide is characterised by the fact that
it targets a specific national, ethnic, racial or religious group.”).
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C. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ROME STATUTE
Although the negotiations surrounding the definition of
“gender” were contentious, they produced a definition that provides adequate ambiguity to allow for an argument that the
LGBT community is protected. Subsection 1 details the negotiations that led to the formulation of “gender” under the Rome
Statute; Subsection 2 presents the criticisms of the resultant
definition; and Subsection 3 explains why that definition still
provides flexibility.
1. The Debate over the Definition of “Gender” in the Rome
Statute
The definition of “gender” included in the Rome Statute
was the result of intense negotiations between sides with incompatible views. The contradictions within the definition of
gender are a reflection of the opposing sides that negotiated the
definition: women advocacy groups on one side, and the Vatican, Arab League states, and conservative organizations on the
65
other side. The word “gender” made its first appearance within the provisions on crimes against humanity as a prohibited
ground upon which persecution could be committed in Febru66
ary 1997. The introduction of the term concerned many parties that its inclusion would leave open the possibility that sexual orientation would be a protected ground upon which one
67
could be persecuted. The Vatican, several Arab states, and
some conservative North American organizations made an attempt to remove the word “gender” completely from the Rome
68
Statute during negotiations. That conservative coalition
worked to eliminate the word “gender” entirely not only because of concerns that sexual orientation would be a protected
group but also because the term evoked thoughts of gender
roles and each genders’ place in society, considerations that
these groups sought to exclude from the protection of the Rome
69
Statute.

65. See Rhonda Copelon, Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating
Crimes Against Women into International Criminal Law, 46 MCGILL L.J. 217,
233 (2000).
66. Oosterveld, supra note 15, at 59.
67. Joydeep Sengupta, How the UN Can Advance Gay Rights, GAY & LESBIAN REV., Nov.–Dec. 2003, at 32.
68. Id.
69. See Copelon, supra note 65, at 236.
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Some negotiators thought that the Rome Statute should
70
simply adopt the United Nations (UN) definition of “gender.”
The UN definition, although it varies slightly across the many
institutions within the organization, has three crucial elements: (1) gender is a socially constructed concept; (2) it is influenced by culture, the roles of each sex, and the value a particular culture places on the sexes fitting into those roles; and
(3) the definition of “gender” varies depending on the time and
71
place. However, the conservative coalition opposed this view
because they feared it could be interpreted to mean that laws
72
outlawing homosexuality would be criminal.
Rather, the conservative coalition advocated for the use of
the term “sex” instead of “gender” because “sex” would be understood to mean simply the biological differences between men
73
and women. There was considerable pushback on this view
because of a feeling that the definition needed to include sociological elements in order to be “an accurate reflection of the
74
current state of international law.” The UN, for example, had
used the word “gender” for that very reason: because it encom75
passed both the biological meaning and sociological ones.
The view that the term “gender” ought to be utilized prevailed, but there was continued concern that homosexuality
76
would be a protected ground under this definition. Ultimately,
the wording “within the context of society” was included in order to satisfy both sides that there was some flexibility while
77
still maintaining a degree of precision. That precision originated from the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Ac-

70. LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 159 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002).
71. Oosterveld, supra note 15, at 67–70.
72. SADAT, supra note 70.
73. Cate Steains, Gender Issues, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 357, 373 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 374.
77. Id.

1302

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:1287

78

tion in which the word “gender” was used in the “ordinary,
79
generally accepted” way.
The result of these negotiations is what is included in the
Rome Statute: “[T]he term ‘gender’ refers to the two sexes, male
and female, within the context of society. The term ‘gender’
80
does not indicate any meaning different from the above.” This
was the only definition that could be negotiated that would satisfy both sides of the debate, and the coalition of Arab states
made clear that this was the only definition they would ac81
cept. In the end, “[t]he reference to ‘the two sexes, male and
female’ was a concession to The Vatican, while the reference to
gender ‘within the context of society’ was a concession to women’s groups, who wanted to include as fluid a concept, and as
82
many iterations, of the term gender as possible.” Although the
controversy surrounding this definition has served as a possible
barrier to prosecuting persecutors of the LGBT community,
there continues to be flexibility in how this definition will be
used and it is this elasticity that also opens the door to future
83
prosecution.
2. The Criticisms of the Definition of “Gender” Under the
Rome Statute
On its face, the definition of “gender” found in the Rome
Statute may be, possibly deliberately, “the most puzzling and
84
bizarre language ever included in an international treaty.”
78. The goal of the Beijing Declaration was to “advance the goals of equality, development and peace for all women everywhere in the interest of all
humanity . . . .” Fourth World Conference on Women, Report of the Fourth
World Conference on Women, resolution 1, annex I ¶ 3, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1 (1995).
79. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Working Paper on Article 20,
Paragraph 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGAL/L.3 (July 13, 1998).
80. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(3).
81. Steains, supra note 73, at 374–75.
82. Brian Kritz, The Global Transgender Population and the International
Criminal Court, 17 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 36 (2014).
83. It is this flexibility that has been at the middle of the controversy
which serves as the subject of this Note. Although the ICC has not yet prosecuted a persecutor of the LGBT community, the door has remained open for
such prosecution to take place in the future. This Note advocates for the use of
the current language of the Rome Statute as a means for empowering OTP to
prosecute such individuals in the future. See infra Part III.
84. Rosemary Grey, Hate Crime Against Humanity? Persecution on the
Grounds of Sexual Orientation Under the Rome Statute, BEYOND THE HAGUE
(Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.beyondthehague.com/2014/02/21/hate-crime
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However, the criticism extends beyond the confusion behind the
definition. Valerie Oosterveld, who has commented extensively
on how the Rome Statute interacts with gender-based crimes,
points to four distinct criticisms of the definition of “gender”
85
under the Rome Statute. Beyond acknowledging the controversy addressed by this Note, whether the LGBT community is
covered under the definition, Oosterveld states that the primary concerns with the definition are that: (1) the terms “gender”
and “sex” have mistakenly been made interchangeable by some
readers of the Rome Statute; (2) the reference to “within the
context of society” may be limited in its application; and (3)
gender issues may not be promoted as a result of this defini86
tion. Others have noted that there is a clear distinction between male and female and those who identify with both sexes
87
or neither may not be protected. Additionally, Brian Kritz,
who has explored the treatment of transgendered individuals
by the Rome Statute, points out that the “within the context of
society” language seems to provide at least an argument that
cultures wherein certain sexual preferences may not be main88
stream are not subjected to this provision.
3. This Definition Maintains Flexibility
Because of the opposing views involved in the negotiations,
what is left is a definition that seems contradictory on one hand
and flexible on the other. It is important to note that since Article 120 of the Rome Statute prohibits reservations from the
89
treaty, this definition applies to all signatories. What makes
the definition of “gender” so flexible is the fact that although
“the compromise[d] language employed . . . was crafted to appease two irreconcilable points of view, both sides may assert
that the definition as adopted reflects their understanding of

-against-humanity-persecution-on-the-grounds-of-sexual-orientation-under
-the-rome-statute (citing Oosterveld, supra note 15, at 56 n.4).
85. Oosterveld, supra note 15, at 71.
86. Id.
87. Kritz, supra note 82, at 36–37.
88. Id.
89. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 120 (“No reservations may be
made to this Statute.”). For a discussion of statements that realistically
amount to a reservation (none of which involve the definition of “gender”), see
generally International Criminal Court: Declarations Amounting to Prohibited
Reservations to the Rome Statute, AMNESTY INT’L (Nov. 24, 2005), https://www
.amnesty.org/en/documents/IOR40/032/2005/en.
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90

the term.” Indeed, there are those that have suggested that
this constructive ambiguity was employed intentionally to re91
solve these “irreconcilable” viewpoints. Those in support of including sexual orientation within the meaning of gender will
emphasize not only that the term “gender” was utilized because
of its broader application, but also that “within the context of
society” makes clear that sociological considerations are part of
92
the definition. Those on the other side will argue that the definition makes clear that it refers only to the male/female dis93
tinction. Yet, because of its seeming inconsistency, the definition “effectively leaves the term open for the future Court to
interpret and apply to the circumstances before it, as appropri94
ate.”
D. ELEMENTS NEEDED TO PROSECUTE UNDER THE ROME
STATUTE
In order to more fully understand what is required to prove
a case in front of the ICC, it is necessary that the elements of
prosecution be highlighted. After satisfying the admissibility
95
criteria under Article 17, there are specific elements for each
particular crime that must be met. The first element under Article 7(1)(h) is “[t]he perpetrator [must have] severely deprived
96
. . . one or more persons of fundamental rights.” Next, a prosecutor would be required to demonstrate that the persecutor
targeted individuals because of their membership in the group
and that the targeting was based on their political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, or gender affiliation, or other
97
grounds that are “universally recognized.” The conduct itself
must have been committed in conjunction with any act referred
90. SADAT, supra note 70, at 160.
91. Valerie Oosterveld, Constructive Ambiguity and the Meaning of “Gender” for the International Criminal Court, 16 INT’L FEMINIST J. POL. 563, 564
(2014) (suggesting that the resulting language is the product of “a tactic used
by diplomats and other negotiators . . . to adopt indefinite language to seemingly resolve disparate points of view”).
92. Oosterveld, supra note 15, at 65 (“While an unusual solution, [the definition of ‘gender’] . . . reaffirmed the valuable sociological reference to ‘context
of society.’”).
93. See infra Part II.B.
94. Steains, supra note 73, at 374.
95. See supra Part I.B.1.
96. ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES TO THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, at 122, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, U.N. Sales No.
E.03.V.2 (2011) [hereinafter ASSEMBLY OF STATES].
97. Id.
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to in Article 7 (such as rape, murder, torture, etc.) or any
crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC, such as a war crime or
99
the crime of genocide. The acts themselves must have been
part of a “widespread or systematic attack directed against a
100
civilian population.” Last, there must be a showing that the
perpetrator knew or intended for the conduct to be part of a
101
“widespread or systematic attack.”
It is worth noting that there are no elements for the defini102
tion of gender. Therefore, what is left for advocates and opponents to argue over is simply the definition itself; there is no
guidance from the ICC on what ultimately will satisfy the
meaning of “gender” under Article 7.
E. WHY PROSECUTION CANNOT HAPPEN UNDER THE
“UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED” PORTION OF ARTICLE 7
Article 7 of the Rome Statute does allow for a degree of
flexibility in determining which groups are protected, by stating that in addition to the enumerated groups, any group that
103
is “universally recognized” will also be protected. Although at
first glance this seems to provide a carve-out in the Rome Statute for groups such as the LGBT community to be brought under the protection of the ICC, the “universally recognized”
standard seems to imply a high burden that this group would
104
not be able to meet. This language is the only reference to a
98. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
99. ASSEMBLY OF STATES, supra note 96, at 122.
100. ASSEMBLY OF STATES, supra note 96. “[T]he term ‘widespread’ connotes the large-scale nature of the attack, which should be massive, frequent,
carried out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a
multiplicity of victims. It entails an attack carried out over a large geographical area or an attack in a small geographical area directed against a large
number of civilians. The underlying offences must also not be isolated.” Prosecutor v. Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b)
of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo, ¶ 83 (June 15, 2009) (citations omitted).
101. Id.
102. In fact, the only places that gender is mentioned within the Elements
of Crimes is to say that within the context of rape, “invasion” is a genderneutral term that can be applied to both males and females. See id. at 119,
n.15.
103. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(h).
104. See George E. Edwards, International Human Rights Law Challenges
to the New International Criminal Court: The Search and Seizure Right to Privacy, 2 YALE J. INT’L L. 323, 377 (2001) (explaining that “universally recognized is more narrow a category than the alternative “internationally recognized” category).
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“universally recognized” set of rights or groups in the entire
treaty, whereas other parts of the Rome Statute acknowledge
that there are “internationally recognized human rights” and
105
“internationally recognized norms and standards.” This provision could have stated that these groups must be “internationally recognized” rather than “universally recognized,” and
the language utilized suggests that there is a higher threshold
106
for proving that a group is “universally recognized.”
By seemingly increasing the burden of proof required for a
group to be considered “universally recognized,” it appears as
though the Rome Statute requires that the protection of such a
group be at least a jus cogens norm in order for the Rome Statute to treat them as such. A jus cogens norm, also referred to as
a peremptory norm, “is a norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having
107
the same character.” In other words, this is a standard that
all states have acknowledged exists and is one that all states
108
are compelled to follow. In order for a norm to ripen into jus
cogens, it must be a practice that has become “more or less uniform” and states have behaved in this manner out of a feeling
109
that they have a “legal obligation” to do so.
If this is the proper reading of this provision of Article 7,
then it is highly unlikely that the LGBT population can be protected under this language. The LGBT community itself has
not received recognition to the level that their protection can be
considered a jus cogens norm; as there are states that have yet
to realize full equality for homosexuals and transgendered individuals, it is clear that their dignity has yet to receive uniform treatment. The mere fact that several states still criminalize homosexual conduct in and of itself indicates non110
uniformity of this protection principle. Therefore, the only avenue toward protecting members of the LGBT community must
go through the Rome Statute’s definition of “gender.”

105. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(1)(c), art. 21(3).
106. Id.
107. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969,
K.A.V. 2424.
108. See id.
109. MARK WESTON JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 48 (6th ed. 2012).
110. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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F. HOW THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY GENERALLY AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS SPECIFICALLY HAVE
PROTECTED THE LGBT COMMUNITY
As has been demonstrated above, the Rome Statute provides a singular route by which the ICC can protect members of
the LGBT community using the definition of “gender.” International human rights courts have made this move already as
both the ECHR and the IACHR have addressed cases involving
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The international community in general has also seen a movement towards
a protection of these rights. Those courts’ case law is addressed
in detail below, looking first to the ECHR in Subsection 1 and
the IACHR in Subsection 2. Subsection 3 briefly touches on developments in the international community as a whole, showing a trend towards respecting the rights of the LGBT community.
1. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
The ECHR has protected members of the LGBT community in several different scenarios and its reasoning could certainly apply with equal force to the ICC. ECHR’s recognition of the
nature of discrimination against the LGBT community and its
understanding of an emerging right to sexual choice has in111
formed its jurisprudence. By examining several ECHR cases
below and demonstrating the interconnectedness of the roles of
112
the ECHR and the ICC, it becomes apparent that the ICC
ought to look to the ECHR for guidance on this issue.
In general, the ECHR has protected members of the LGBT
community under Article 14 of the European Convention on
113
Human Rights, which touches on discrimination. By invoking
111. See PAUL JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 89 (2013) (“[T]he [ECHR] has adopted a particular ontological
understanding of homosexuality and this has underpinned the progressive development of its case law through which it has narrowed the margin of appreciation available to states in respect of certain discriminatory practices. . . .
The Court’s methods have not, therefore, precluded it from issuing strong condemnations of practices that maintain inequalities on the ground of sexual
orientation.”).
112. See infra Part II.C.
113. See European Convention on Human Rights art. 14, Dec. 10, 1948, 213
U.N.T.S. 232 (“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex,
race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or status.”).
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its discrimination provision, while also coupling it with Article
8, which protects the “right to respect for . . . private and family
114
life,” the ECHR found in favor of a Polish national who had
115
been evicted from his home because of his sexual orientation.
The ECHR took into consideration developments in society “including the fact that there [was] not just one way or one choice
in the sphere of leading and living one’s private life” and refused to accept that “a blanket exclusion of persons living in a
homosexual relationship from succession to a tenancy . . . as
116
necessary for the protection of the family.” The ECHR, therefore, found protection for this homosexual man by finding that
there had been “a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction
117
with Article 8.”
In other cases, the ECHR has found that there has been a
violation of a specific right and found that the violation, in tandem with discrimination, was enough to find the state guilty,
118
much like is required in the Rome Statute. In X v. Turkey,
the ECHR found that a man who had been placed in solitary
confinement out of concern that he, as a homosexual, would be
harmed by other inmates had suffered a violation of the
119
However, more generally, the
ECHR’s torture provisions.
ECHR stated that discrimination “based solely on . . . sexual
orientation . . . would amount to discrimination” by itself and
that “sexual orientation attracts the protection of Article 14,”

114. Id. art. 8.
115. Kozak v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R., (2010), http://www.hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-97597.
116. Id.; see also Press Release, Registrar of the Court, European Court of
Human Rights, Repeated Unjustified Ban on Gay-Rights Marches in Moscow
(Oct. 21, 2010) (on file with author) (describing the court’s decision in
Alekseyev v. Russia: “[W]hile no European consensus had been reached on
questions of adoption by or marriage between homosexual people, ample case
law had shown the existence of a long-standing European consensus on questions such as the abolition of criminal liability for homosexual relations between adults, on homosexuals’ access to service in the armed forces, to the
granting of parental rights, to equality in tax matters and the right to succeed
to the deceased partner’s tenancy. It was also clear that other Convention
member States recognised the right of people to openly identify themselves as
gay and to promote their rights and freedoms, in particular by peacefully and
publicly gathering together.”).
117. Kozak v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R., (2010), http://www.hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-97597.
118. See X v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., (2012), http://www.hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-113876.
119. See id.; European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 113, art.
3.
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the discrimination provision of the European Convention on
120
Human Rights.
Not only does the growing support for the protection of the
LGBT community within legal institutions demonstrate that
the ICC ought to protect this group, a comparison of the treaties of the ICC and ECHR demonstrates that similar principles
could be applied in the chambers of the ICC. ECHR found room
for protection of the LGBT community under its discrimination
provision despite the fact that this article only mentions “sex”
121
as a protected group and not “gender.” It appears as though
the ECHR determined that the LGBT community fell under the
122
more restrictive term of “sex.” The ECHR performed a similar
analysis in the Kozak and X cases than what would be seen in
the ICC: only after identifying specific enumerated, prohibited
conduct under which the victim had been wronged were the defendants found to have violated the ECHR’s provision on dis123
crimination.
However, one important difference between cases brought
to the ECHR and those heard by the ICC is the fact that cases
124
can be brought to the ECHR by citizens. Yet, this difference
does not point to a glaring flaw of the Rome Statute, only a difference of the roles of the two courts. Instead, this variation in
the ICC’s functioning only serves to reinforce the thesis of this
Note: OTP must act to bring crimes against humanity cases
committed against members of the LGBT community to the
ICC. Because such cases cannot be flagged by injured individuals, the ICC has a duty to protect these individuals by using its
resources to investigate and prosecute those who have commit125
ted crimes against humanity against the LGBT community.
120. X v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 50 (2012), http://www.hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng?i=001-113876.
121. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 113, art. 14.
122. It is doubtful that the ECHR would find that the LGBT community
fell under the categorization of the other protected groups: “[R]ace, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association
with a national minority, property, birth, or other status.” Id. Thus, simple
logic would seem to indicate that the ECHR chose to include “homosexual” under the “sex” heading of the treaty.
123. See X v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., (2012), http://www.hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-113876; Kozak v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R., (2010), http://www.hudoc
.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-97597.
124. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 113, art. 25 (“The
Commission may receive petitions . . . from any person . . . claiming to be the
victim of a violation . . . .”).
125. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21 (“The application and inter-
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2. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR)
The IACHR has found that mistreatment of homosexuals
constitutes a violation of Article 11, which relates to an indi126
vidual’s right to privacy. In the Giraldo case, the court found
that a prisoner’s right to privacy had been violated when her
request for an intimate visit in prison was denied, in violation
127
of Colombian law, because she was a homosexual. The Colombian government’s argument that the denial was appropriate because of a “deeply rooted intolerance in Latin American
128
culture of homosexual practices” was denied. Article 11 of the
Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, which was used
as the basis upon which the petitioner was protected, relates to
privacy and protects three distinct rights: (1) an individual’s
honor and dignity; (2) the right of an individual to not “be the
object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life”;
and that (3) all individuals have the right to be protected by the
129
law from such “interference or attacks.” This case makes
clear that homosexuals cannot be discriminated against under
the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights and cultural
relativity cannot be used as a means by which one can argue
that these provisions do not apply.
3. Developing Trends in the International Community in
General
Since the time the Rome Statute was negotiated in the late
1990s, there have been considerable developments in the international community on the treatment of gays and lesbians. In
considering the rights of transgender individuals in the ICC,
Brian Kritz points to many developments that indicate greater
acceptance internationally for the rights of members of the
130
LGBT community. Specifically, Kritz notes countries like Ma-

pretation of law pursuant to this article must be . . . without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph
3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status.”).
126. Giraldo v. Colombia, Case 11.656, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
71/99, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.106, doc. 3 rev. ¶ 21 (1999).
127. Id. ¶ 6.
128. Id. ¶ 12.
129. Inter-American Convention on Human Rights art. 11, Nov. 22, 1969,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
130. Kritz, supra note 82, at 1.
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lawi and Colombia have made significant steps towards promoting the dignity of the LGBT communities within their re131
However, the most impactful movement
spective borders.
from the international community is likely the UN Resolution
132
on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.
The UN noted crimes of violence that have occurred against
members of the LGBT community and recognized that the UN
has an obligation to “promot[e] universal respect for the protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all,
without distinction of any kind and in a fair and equal man133
ner.” Yet, this step does not obviate the need for progress
within the ICC; despite the passage of this resolution (by a slim
margin no less, with nineteen countries voting against the pro134
posal), violations against the LGBT community still continue
such that the ICC must step in hold persecutors accountable.
*****
As has been demonstrated above, the definition of “gender”
found in the Rome Statue was the result of a series of contentious negotiations and does not, on its face, appear to protect
members of the LGBT community. Yet, this route seems to present the only possible opportunity by which the ICC can protect
members of this vulnerable population. The definition employed by the treaty maintains a degree of flexibility and by
looking to the work of other international institutions, a developing trend of protecting the rights of the LGBT community becomes apparent. Both the momentum in the international system as well as the definition at the disposal of the ICC can be
utilized to prosecute persecutors of LGBT populations. While
this Note establishes that the debate over the meaning of “gender” under the Rome Statute continues, it explores how sexual
orientation fits into this framework, concludes that the LGBT
community is covered under the definition, and proposes that

131. See id.
132. Human Rights Council, Res. 17/19, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/19 (July
14, 2011).
133. Id. This language is similar to the language found in Article 21(3) of
the Rome Statute, directing the ICC to apply only law that makes no “adverse
distinction” among protected groups. See id.
134. See id. Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Djibouti, Gabon,
Ghana, Jordan, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Moldova, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and Uganda all voted against the proposal, with Burkina Faso, China, and Zambia abstaining from the vote. Id.
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the approaches of other international institutions can inform
the processes of the ICC.
II. INTERPRETATION OF THE ROME STATUTE’S
DEFINITION OF GENDER AND EMPLOYING THE
AMBIGUITY THEREIN
By analyzing the definition of “gender” in the Rome Statute, the criticisms become exceedingly clear. These criticisms
all lead to the same conclusion: the application of the definition
of “gender” beyond the male and female distinction remains
unsettled. Yet, it is because this issue has not yet been resolved
that allows one to argue that the LGBT community does in fact
fit under this definition. While there are those that argue they
do not, the arguments in the other direction hold more weight.
135
An explanation of the criticisms of the definition and how the
136
social construction of gender fits into this discussion both
make clear that sexual orientation can be comprehended under
the current formulation of “gender” found in the Rome Statute.
Although the definition certainly evokes a wide range of reactions, it is important to note that the definition did not close the
door on including members of the LGBT community. This flexibility and ambiguity are both tools that can be used in order to
advocate that the ICC look to approaches by international human rights courts for guidance.
In this Part, the ambiguity of the definition of “gender” is
further analyzed. Section A discusses the flexibility of the definition and demonstrates that the question of whether or not
the LGBT community falls within this definition is one left unanswered. Next, Section B addresses arguments that some
have advanced stating that the definition of “gender” precludes
the idea that the LGBT community falls within its bounds.
However, this Note rejects those arguments while also demonstrating that sexual preference indeed does fall under the “gender” heading. Finally, Section C establishes that, although human rights courts have a different function than the ICC, it is
appropriate for the ICC to consider their jurisprudence on persecution of individuals on the basis of sexual orientation.

135. See supra Part I.C.2.
136. See infra Part II.B.2.
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A. THE APPLICABLE MEANING OF THE DEFINITION OF “GENDER”
IS STILL AN OPEN QUESTION
137

In spite of the criticism of the definition of “gender,” and
indeed highlighted by it, the meaning of the Rome Statute’s
definition of “gender” is one that allows for considerable conjecture as to whether the LGBT community falls under its protection. Unsurprisingly, the definition of “gender” produced by the
negotiations of the Rome Statute has received widespread criticism because of its inherent inconsistencies as well as because
138
of its seemingly narrow application. It is this uncertainty that
enables one to make the argument that members of the LGBT
community who have been the targets of crimes against hu139
manity can be protected under Article 7 of the Rome Statute.
First, it is important to recall that the negotiations of the
Rome Statute ultimately employed the term “gender” precisely
because of its broader application beyond the simple male and
140
female distinction. By not using the term “sex,” the ICC has
implicitly acknowledged the “well-established practice of using
141
[a] broader concept in international instruments.” The term
“sex” could be understood to refer only to the biological differences between men and women, but the use of “gender” seems
142
to acknowledge the social construction of gender roles.
In fact, OTP has given guidance that indicates the office
143
will specifically consider such non-biological meanings. The
first such indication can be found in OTP’s own definition of

137. See supra Part I.C.2.
138. See supra Part I.C.2.
139. Contra Bohlander, supra note 11, at 409 (“[I]t appears unconvincing to
assume that the drafters engaged in a conspiratorial exercise of ‘constructive
ambiguity’ with the intention of leaving the door open to the ICC judges to interpret a wider meaning into the term ‘gender’ in Art. 7(3) . . . .”). However,
rather than this disagreement meaning that the language specifically excludes
protection of the LGBT community, it simply led to a more open-ended definition. What was achieved was an entirely ambiguous and divided definition.
This ambiguity does not by itself preclude reinterpretation.
140. See Steains, supra note 73.
141. Barbara Bedont & Katherine Hall-Martinez, Ending Impunity for
Gender Crimes Under the International Criminal Court, 6 BROWN J. WORLD
AFF. 65, 68 (1999).
142. See Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman, Article 21: Applicable Law, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 701, 712 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 1999).
143. See generally OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 3 passim (stating repeatedly that the “social construction” of gender is inherent in any consideration of the term).
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“gender-based crimes,” which states that this category of crimes
includes acts “committed against persons, whether male or female, because of their sex and/or socially constructed gender
144
roles.” Not only does this statement recognize the difference
between the terms “sex” and “gender,” it makes explicit that
OTP will consider variations of gender that transcend the
realm of biology. To go a step further, OTP has acknowledged
that there are valuable precedents that can be borrowed from
145
the area of persecution under refugee law. OTP has made explicit reference to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and its understanding of “persecutions on
146
the basis of gender in refugee law.” UNHCR, for its part, has
made clear that sexual orientation ought to be considered when
an individual “has been subject to persecutory (including discriminatory) action on account of his or her sexuality or sexual
147
practices.” Such a reference by OTP, in its official position
paper on gender no less, seems to be a strong signal that, at the
very least, it has considered, albeit not officially and formally,
how sexual orientation may fall within the Rome Statute’s definition of “gender.” Lastly, and most importantly, OTP has
stated that the definition of “gender” under Article 7(3) of the
Rome Statute “acknowledges the social construction of gender,
and the accompanying roles, behaviours, activities, and attrib148
utes assigned to women and men, and to girls and boys.”
Thus, it seems clear that OTP has acknowledged that it is open
to a broader definition of “gender” than one that only contemplates the female/male distinction.
Additionally, the definition of “gender” is not one that
ought to change as one crosses borders. The definition does not
144. Id. at 3.
145. Id. at 19 n.34.
146. Id. (citing U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of
the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶¶ 3, 16, 17, 30, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees]).
147. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 146, ¶ 16 (“A claimant’s
sexuality or sexual practices may be relevant to a refugee claim where he or
she has been subject to persecutory (including discriminatory) action on account of his or her sexuality or sexual practices. In many such cases, the
claimant has refused to adhere to socially or culturally defined roles or expectations of behaviour attributed to his or her sex. The most common claims involve homosexuals, transsexuals or transvestites, who have faced extreme
public hostility, violence, abuse, or severe or cumulative discrimination.”).
148. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 3, at 3.
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allow for cultural relativity but instead requires a broad inter149
pretation of the meaning of gender, as laid out above. Indeed,
the “within the context of society” part of the definition was included so as to acknowledge these “sociological differences,” not
150
to ignore them.
B. SOME ARGUE THAT THE DEFINITION OF “GENDER”
CONTEMPLATES, AND REJECTS, INCLUSION OF THE LGBT
COMMUNITY, YET THESE OBSERVATIONS ARE MISGUIDED
Some commentators have argued that the Rome Statute
has rejected the notion advocated by this Note, instead stating
that, by defining “gender” along the biological male/female divide, the Rome Statute has rejected any argument that this
definition encompasses the rights of the LGBT community.
However, these arguments ignore that sociological considerations are a part of the “gender” definition and that sexual orientation is itself a sociological construct. Subsection 1 explores
these arguments while Subsection 2 establishes that the term
“gender” inherently considers the sociological considerations.
1. Arguments That the Rome Statute’s Definition of “Gender”
Does Not Include the LGBT Community
Those who posit that the definition of “gender” found in the
Rome Statute does not cover members of the LGBT community
base their argument on the understanding that the definition
151
states that it applies “to the two sexes, male and female.”
Thus, the argument goes, the definition of “gender” has categorically eliminated any meaning that goes beyond simply the biological differences between men and women. Yet, this understanding of the term contains two fatal flaws: (1) it conflates

149. See Kelly D. Askin, Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court, 10 CRIM. L.F. 33, 47–48 (1999).
150. Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 141.
151. See, e.g., Rana Lehr-Lenardt, One Small Step for Women: FemaleFriendly Provisions in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
16 BYU J. PUB. L. 317, 340 (2002) (“[G]ender means male and female, not homosexual.”); David Scheffer, The International Criminal Court, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 67, 71 (William Schabas & Nadia Bernaz eds., 2011) (“[T]he term ‘gender,’ which is used as a category of discriminatory conduct for the crime of persecution, can refer only ‘to the two
sexes, male and female, within the context of society.’ Thus, at least in theory,
widespread or systematic persecution based on other types of possible gender
discrimination (gays, transvestites, bisexuals) might not qualify as a crime
against humanity under the Rome Statute.”).
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the terms “gender” and “sex”; and (2) it ignores the understanding of the definition of “gender” by OTP, which explicitly
acknowledges the social construction of the term. “Gender” and
152
“sex” are two terms that mean crucially different things. Inherently, the term “gender” recognizes the social differences
and construction of gender identity norms, while the term “sex”
does not. OTP has stated as much by acknowledging that in
considering a gender-based crime, it is crucial that the social
153
Additionally, the
construction of the term be considered.
154
phrase “within the context of society” was included in the text
155
and must be given meaning; indeed, this phrase indicates
that sociological concerns must be part of any consideration of
gender and not restricted simply to a distinction between men
and women. Thus, it seems clear that these arguments that the
definition of “gender” eliminated the LGBT from protection under the Rome Statute ought to be rejected.
2. How Sexual Preference Fits into the Definition of “Gender”
It is important to recall that the term “gender,” and not
“sex,” was included in the Rome Statute because of its broader
meaning, which contemplates the social construction of gender
156
and the roles that society applies to each gender. This deliberate choice in the process of the negotiations cannot mean
nothing—every word and its choice should be given its appro157
priate meaning. In this case, the use of the word “gender” explicitly acknowledges that crimes based on gender, and not just

152. See HEAVEN CRAWLEY, REFUGEES AND GENDER: LAW AND PROCESS
163 n.1 (2001).
153. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 3, at 3 (stating that
the definition of “gender” “acknowledges the social construction of gender”).
154. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(3).
155. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340, 8 I.L.M. 679, 691–92 (establishing the text of
the treaty as the primary source for treaty interpretation). Other sources can
be used to supplement that interpretation, but the text is to be consulted first
“in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning given” to such words.
See id. art. 31(1)–(2).
156. See Steains, supra note 73.
157. In statutory interpretation, it is well accepted that all words in a given
statute or treaty should be recognized as having meaning. See, e.g., LARRY M.
EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 13–14 (2011), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97
-589.pdf (“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant
. . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
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those based on the biological distinctions between men and
women, will be recognized under the Rome Statute.
As this aspect of social construction is acknowledged in the
definition of “gender,” so too is the fact that this definition
ought to cover members of the LGBT community. Sexual orien158
tation is itself a concept that is “social in origin.” Sexual orientation is a socially constructed concept that is learned by
humans and some follow certain “scripts” as it relates to how
159
society expects them to behave sexually. Human sexuality itself is not something that is devoid of social pressures and these forces ought to be recognized when analyzing gender-based
160
crimes.
Indeed, some will likely argue that this group is one that
does not need protection and will question the proposition that
the LGBT community is a group at all; rather, many may argue
that the immoral behavior of this group is targeted, not the individuals themselves. However, the adverse treatment of the
LGBT community is in fact an acknowledgement that this
group exists. By treating individuals who possess this “moral
deficiency” as targets of persecution, those who deny these
groups’ existence only affirm it. Their actions speak to the fact
that their societies recognize such groups and, in recognition of
individuals’ membership in that group, they are subjected to
persecutory treatment. What may appear to be an outward rejection of the existence of the group of the LGBT community is
in fact an implicit acknowledgement of the group’s actuality.
Members of the LGBT community are targeted for these crimes
because of society’s recognition of their membership in this
group and certain individuals’ views of that group. The fact
that LGBT individuals do not conform to society’s construction
of gender is precisely why these gender-based crimes exist. The

158. Richard R. Troiden, The Formation of Homosexual Identities, 17 J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 43, 44 (1989) (“Sexual conduct is primarily social in origin.
Existing sociocultural arrangements define what sexuality is, the purposes it
serves, its manner of expression, and what it means to be sexual. People learn
to be sexual pretty much as they learn everything else. Women and men are
born with an open-ended, diffuse, and relatively fluid capacity for bodily
pleasure that is shaped and expressed through sexual scripts[,] . . . [which] are
articulated by the wider culture . . . .” (citations omitted)).
159. Id.
160. See id.; see also JOHN H. GAGNON & WILLIAM SIMON, SEXUAL CONDUCT: THE SOCIAL SOURCES OF HUMAN SEXUALITY ix (2d ed. 2005) (introducing what has become known as the “social constructionist” view of human sexuality).
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ICC certainly should acknowledge this social construction in its
decisions to prosecute.
C. THE INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF THE WORK DONE BY
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS AND THAT OF THE ICC
At first glance, it appears as though international human
rights courts and the ICC have different roles in the international judicial community. The role of human rights courts is
more often viewed as a mechanism by which states are held re161
sponsible, while the ICC was established to bring individual
162
actors to justice. However, the two are connected in that both
promote and protect the same sets of rights; the ways in which
they guarantee those rights may differ, but their roles are interconnected so as to allow one to borrow from the other. Additionally, both are governed by principles of jus cogens, which
163
apply to all international actors. As such, there is a considerable degree of practicality in courts recognizing and upholding
a more or less uniform set of rights so as to conform with their
164
It
complementary roles within the international system.
would be foolhardy for the international legal community collectively to espouse differing sets of rights, which depended
solely on under which jurisdiction a particular case fell. In fact,
OTP has stated that it hopes to contribute to the international
community’s growing understanding of the meaning of genderbased violence, thus acknowledging the interconnectedness of
165
the ICC’s work with the work of other human rights courts.
161. See, e.g., European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 113, art.
19 (“To ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High
Contracting Parties in the present Convention, there shall be set up . . . [a]
European Court of Human Rights . . . .”).
162. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 1 (“An International Criminal Court
(‘the Court’) is hereby established. It shall be a permanent institution and
shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern . . . .” (emphasis added)).
163. See supra Part I.E.
164. See Harmen van der Wilt & Sandra Lyngdorf, Procedural Obligations
Under the European Convention on Human Rights: Useful Guidelines for the
Assessment of ‘Unwillingness’ and ‘Inability’ in the Context of the Complementarity Principle, 9 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 39, 41–42 (2009) (“The concurrence of
state responsibility and individual responsibility which is increasingly recognized in legal doctrine is an incentive for courts to consult each other’s decisions and elaborate, when appropriate and with the necessary modifications,
on each other’s findings in the field of evidence and legal concepts.” (citations
omitted)).
165. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 3, at 10–11 (“The objectives
of the policy [of sexual and gender-based crimes] are to . . . [c]ontribute,
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Jus cogens, which governs all conduct in the international
166
community, and the complementarity of these courts supports a more well-defined set of rights to be protected. Jus
cogens dictates that there is a duty to prosecute crimes against
167
humanity, and when states have failed to bring justice to the
168
victims of such crimes, the ICC has the role of prosecuting.
Many critics have pointed out that a failure of the ICC to prosecute in certain regards can constitute a grant of amnesty to
169
individuals who have committed atrocious crimes. The inaction of the ICC, and domestic courts, leads to impunity for
those individuals; thus, the ICC has a duty to prosecute crimes
170
falling under this heading.
Indeed, the Rome Statute and the organic treaty of the
ECHR, the European Convention on Human Rights, both derive from similar principles. Notably, both treaties acknowledge
that their purpose is to promote international “peace” and “jus171
tice.” Although each treaty invokes differing mechanisms for
achieving these ends, both acknowledge that they are established for similar purposes. Not only were these treaties designed to uphold similar rights but also, in striving to meet these goals, it is appropriate to compare their methods for doing
so.
Specifically in the area of persecution based on gender,
“the ICC should also look outside of international criminal law
for guidance” because of the fact that this relatively “newly
identified [area of] gender-based persecution has not been ana172
lyzed in the same depth” as other crimes against humanity.
Because the area of gender was so contentious during the negothrough its implementation, to the ongoing development of international jurisprudence regarding sexual and gender-based crimes.”).
166. JANIS, supra note 109.
167. Michael Scharf, The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International
Legal Obligation To Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 41, 52–59 (1996).
168. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(a).
169. See generally Scharf, supra note 167, at 41 (providing examples of
countries that granted amnesty) (citing Michael Vickery & Naomi RohtArriaza, Human Rights in Cambodia, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 251 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995)).
170. See id.
171. Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl; European Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 113, pmbl.
172. Valerie Oosterveld, Gender, Persecution, and the International Criminal Court: Refugee Law’s Relevance to the Crime Against Humanity of GenderBased Persecution, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 49, 49 (2006).
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tiation process and the ICC’s precedents offer little guidance in
this area, the ICC should be even more willing to find guidance
173
in the approaches of other courts. Therefore, when the ICC
judges are exploring areas of the law yet to be broached by the
ICC, they can and ought to find guidance in the work of other
174
courts who have examined these issues. A judicial body, such
as the ICC, with limited precedents and practice seems to be
exactly the kind of court that could borrow from the experiences of other courts that have grappled with similar issues. OTP
itself has acknowledged the value of looking to precedents in
175
refugee law, citing the work by Professor Oosterveld.
The Rome Statute itself provides guidance that seems to
demonstrate that it is appropriate to consider human rights
and the practices of other institutions. The standards of admissibility of the ICC consider not only a complete failure of the
national judicial systems but also “situations involving some
judicial action, however in a manner that fails to conform with
176
fundamental human rights.” Thus, the Rome Statute explicitly recognizes that considerations of human rights are to be
173. See id.
174. See id. at 51–52. Oosterveld makes a link between international refugee law and the developing area of law that is gender-based persecution under
Article 7 of the Rome Statute:
This link is helpful because international and domestic refugee law
has explored certain elements of gender-related persecution that are,
at present, unexplored in international criminal law. Therefore, when
the ICC’s judges are determining the content of the elements of the
crime against humanity of gender-based persecution, they should examine principles or rules found within refugee law. This is not to argue that a definition of gender-related persecution found within international refugee law should be directly transferred to the crime
against humanity of gender-based persecution. . . . Rather, the ICC
should evaluate how refugee law approaches to gender-related persecution can shed considerable light on international criminal law’s relatively undeveloped understanding of gender-based persecution. Even
if the ICC decides that certain aspects of refugee law relating to gender-related persecution do not rise to the level of ‘principles and rules
of international law’ or general principles of domestic law, they may
still help guide the ICC toward a full understanding of gender-based
persecution.
Id. (citations omitted). Professor Oosterveld’s connection between refugee law
and the crime of gender-based persecution is informative in this regard as
well, as the ICC’s practices of prosecuting based on persecution of the LGBT
community can borrow approaches and principles from other institutions and
bodies of law that have previously addressed these issues. See id.
175. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 3, at 19 n.34.
176. Jessica Almqvist, Complementarity and Human Rights: A Litmus Test
for the International Criminal Court, 30 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 335,
339 (2008) (citing Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 20(3)).
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weighed in determining whether or not a case should be
177
brought in front of the ICC. Those same considerations ought
to apply not only when evaluating domestic judicial action, but
also when human rights violations are implicated. Most importantly, the Rome Statute states that the tribunal shall apply
“law . . . [that is] consistent with internationally recognized
human rights, and . . . without any adverse distinction founded
on grounds such as gender, as defined in article 7, paragraph
178
3.” Thus, no matter what the definition of gender states, if
human rights law protects members of the LGBT community,
then the ICC must apply that law.
It is quite clear that not only should the ICC consider acts
of other human rights courts but also that the ICC must do so.
Examining several cases from the ECHR and IACHR and de179
velopments in the international court generally makes clear
that the international human rights community has made
steps toward protecting members of the LGBT community and
that ICC ought to do the same.
III. THE PRACTICES BY HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS AND
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW PROVIDE
AVENUES TOWARD PROTECTING MEMBERS OF THE
LGBT COMMUNITY IN THE ICC
Other courts’ processes and means for protecting members
of the LGBT community can be informative in determining how
the ICC can do the same. Although the structures of human
rights courts and the means by which they adopt their standards differ from a court with international criminal jurisdiction
like the ICC, the framework under which the ECHR and the
IACHR protect on the basis of sexual orientation can serve as a
model for the ICC. Human rights courts, as protectors of specified civil liberties, and criminal courts, which punish those who
violate those same rights, have a connected function in the international judicial system. As such, the practices of one can inform the other.
As the interconnectedness of the frameworks of the ICC
and human rights courts have been established in Part II.C,
Section A begins by employing the analyses from the ECHR
and IACHR in the context of the ICC. Next, Section B proposes
177. See id.
178. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(3).
179. See supra Part I.F.
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specific language OTP can adopt in order to make clear that the
LGBT community is protected under the Rome Statute’s definition of “gender.” Section C addresses counterarguments some
may levy against this proposal. Finally, Section D concludes by
exploring developments in international law generally and considers how they may inform the conversation.
A. USING THE METHODS EMPLOYED BY HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE ICC
The ECHR and the IACHR employed logic that is not
unique to the area of human rights law; indeed, the same logic
can apply to the ICC’s persecution analysis under Article
7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute. The ICC must look to other international law sources, particularly human rights courts, for
precedent, especially in areas the ICC itself has not ad180
dressed. Although the ECHR and IACHR cases discussed
above examined discrimination, the ICC can follow that approach when determining how to treat cases involving the maltreatment of the LGBT community. Additionally, the Rome
Statute contains provisions, namely Article 21, which provide
the same sort of recognitions of dignity that were vital in the
181
analysis conducted by both the ECHR and IACHR.
Although discrimination and persecution both serve as distinct bases for crimes in these courts, their relationship is simply one of scale and gravity. What is most important in recognizing the relationship between the crimes of discrimination and
persecution is that they are both founded in the same principle:
targeting an individual because of that person’s membership in
a particular group is impermissible. “[T]he dividing line between discrimination and persecution is not a clear one”; however, it is one that exists and under certain circumstances, “dis182
crimination can constitute persecution.” It may be helpful to
imagine the two concepts on a spectrum, where conduct that is
considered discriminatory can cross into being considered persecution once a certain threshold is breached. There is a predominant view that in order for “non-violent discrimination to
amount to persecution, a high threshold of that form of ill-

180. See supra Part II.C.
181. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21.
182. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, ¶ 55, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/67 (July 22, 1991).
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183

treatment [must] be surmounted.” Where that line is remains
a question that cannot be easily answered. However, knowing
that there is a point at which discriminatory behavior transforms into persecution is an important consideration in applying the case law of the ECHR and IACHR to the ICC. Although
none of the cases addressed by these two human rights courts
has dealt with persecution per se, it is accepted, both by the
184
185
Rome Statute and more generally, that gender-specific discrimination is the kind of conduct that will fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC if it rises to the level of persecution.
Understanding this relationship is crucial in understanding how the jurisprudence surrounding discrimination law in
international human rights courts can be applied to the ICC.
Clearly, the fact that these human rights courts have addressed the maltreatment of the LGBT community within the
context of discrimination should not hinder the ICC from adopting the approaches of these courts. In fact, as persecution is a
harsher form of discrimination, the ICC should be eager to
prosecute when it is faced with a set of facts that would amount
to the gravity and severity required to move a crime from the
realm of discrimination to persecution. Further, the ECHR and
IACHR have found it proper to extend their protection to members of the LGBT community despite the fact that their enabling treaties refer only to discrimination based on “sex” rather
186
than based on “gender.” Although “sex” is viewed as the nar187
rower of the two terms, the LGBT community has been protected under this heading and the same logic can certainly be
applied under a broader “gender” framework.
Therefore, in order to apply the same analysis from the
human rights courts discussed above, what must first be identified is a principle within the Rome Statute that recognizes the
right to dignity for all individuals. The character of the treaty
itself may serve as a starting point in this regard; however, a
183. Robin Tam, Immigration Judicial Review: Essential Respondent Cases, 5 JUD. REV. 121, 125 (2000).
184. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(h) (listing “gender” as a protected group under the persecution provision of the crimes against humanity
article).
185. Bret Thiele, Persecution on Account of Gender: A Need for Refugee Law
Reform, 11 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 221, 231 (2000) (“[T]ransgression of social
mores and sexual discrimination can rise to the level of persecution.”).
186. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 113, art. 14;
Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 129, art. 1.
187. See supra Part II.A.
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more specific view on the topic can be found in Article 21, the
188
provision on the applicable law of the ICC. In full, Article 21
states the following:
(1) The Court shall apply:
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its
Rules of Procedure and Evidence;
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties
and the principles and rules of international law, including the
established principles of the international law of armed conflict;
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court
from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are
not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and
internationally recognized norms and standards.
(2) The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in
its previous decisions.
(3) The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article
must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and
be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender, as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language,
religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social
189
origin, wealth, birth or other status.

Most crucially for the purposes of this Note, this provision
recognizes the importance of (1) looking to other sources of international law for guidance; (2) that the applicable law of the
ICC should conform to human rights law; and (3) the application of the law should be done in a way that does not bring an
“adverse distinction” to any group. These first two points make
clear that looking to the law of the ECHR and IACHR for guidance is appropriate; the last states that the LGBT community
should not be deprived of the protection afforded to other
groups.
When viewed in conjunction with one another, these two
establish a crucial premise: no person shall be persecuted under the jurisdiction of the ICC and the ICC ought to enforce the
law so as to prevent distinction among the groups enumerated
in Article 21. The overarching principle found within Article
21(3) is the equal application of laws in such a way that no particular group is disadvantaged. Of course, sexual orientation is
not listed explicitly as a protected ground, but this Note’s discussion of the Rome Statute’s definition of “gender” demonstrates that the LGBT community can, and should, fit under
188. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21.
189. Id.
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this heading. Justice clearly calls for the equal protection of the
law to extend to this group and the practices of human rights
courts such as the ECHR and IACHR indicate that work is already being done on this front. In order to best “guarantee last190
ing respect for and the enforcement of international justice”
the ICC must adopt a policy of prosecuting those who persecute
members of the LGBT community.
B. OTP SHOULD ADOPT AN EXPLICIT POLICY RECOGNIZING
THAT MEMBERS OF THE LGBT COMMUNITY ARE COVERED
UNDER THE ROME STATUTE’S FORMULATION OF “GENDER”
In order to effectuate a more open and natural reading of
the Rome Statute’s definition of “gender,” it is crucial that OTP
promulgate an official, explicit policy that makes clear that
members of the LGBT community fall within this definition.
OTP holds an important role in that it is the body that both
brings crimes in front of the ICC and it plays a crucial role in
deciphering the text of the Rome Statute when determining
191
what cases can and cannot be brought before the ICC. OTP
has not shied away from interpreting its obligations, outlining
its understanding of certain aspects of the Rome Statute, and
192
proclaiming future goals; therefore, such a step by OTP is by
no means radical or an invalid extension of its power. OTP has
signaled that it may be moving in this direction by stressing
that the definition of “gender” involves sociological considera193
tions and by making clear that it will continue to focus on
194
gendered crimes going forward. Such a policy could take the
form of the following language:
Recognizing that the current definition of “gender” found within the
Rome Statute: (1) was the result of contentious debates; (2) arose in
an environment in which the rights of the LGBT community were not
as widely accepted as they are today; and (3) was ultimately adopted
in order to acknowledge both the biological and sociological differ190. Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl.
191. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
192. For a list of papers on policy and strategy OTP has released, see Policies and Strategies, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp/Pages/
otp-policies.aspx (last visited Nov. 28, 2016) (including policy papers on the
following topics: “Policy Paper on the Interest of Justice,” “Policy Paper on Victims’ Participation,” “Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes,” “OTP
Strategic Plan 2016–2018,” and “Draft Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation”).
193. See OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 3, passim.
194. Strategic Plan: 2016–2018, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Nov. 16, 2015), https://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/EN-OTP_Strategic_Plan_2016-2018.pdf.
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ences between members of different gendered identities, OTP
acknowledges that members of the LGBT community are covered under the Rome Statute’s definition of “gender.” OTP, the ICC itself, and
the negotiators of the Rome Statute have all long recognized that the
term “gender” included sociological considerations and this policy
serves as an explicit recognition that members of the LGBT community who are subjected to persecutory conduct (that meets all other requirements) will be considered to be a gendered group under Article 7
of the treaty. Not only does a plain reading of the words employed by
the Rome Statute inform this interpretation, but so does the ICC’s following obligations to: (1) conform to human rights law generally; and
(2) apply the law in such a way as not to adversely affect distinct
groups. As such, OTP concludes that it has the jurisdiction to prosecute those who have targeted members of the LGBT community under Article 7.

Without such an explicit policy, the debate on whether or
not crimes committed against the LGBT community can be
brought in front of the ICC will continue. Until the OTP takes
action, the same arguments advanced by both sides will be recycled and it is unlikely that any progress will be made on this
front. Although some signatories to the Rome Statute may be
opposed to such an interpretation, this result is one that flows
naturally from the negotiations of the treaty and the developments in international law.
195
Many practical barriers to prosecution still exist, but
with this threshold question resolved, OTP will be enabled to

195. Both the limited resources of the ICC and the desires of victims are of
tantamount concern. See Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the
Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. CT. 3 (Sept. 2003), https://www.icc-cpi.int/
NR/rdonlyres/1FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B25-60AA962ED8B6/143594/030905_
Policy_Paper.pdf (“The Court is an institution with limited resources. The Office will function with a two-tiered approach to combat impunity. On the one
hand it will initiate prosecutions of the leaders who bear most responsibility
for the crimes. On the other hand it will encourage national prosecutions,
where possible, for the lower-ranking perpetrators, or work with the international community to ensure that the offenders are brought to justice by some
other means.”); see also Catherine Gegout, The International Criminal Court:
Limits, Potential and Conditions for the Promotion of Justice and Peace, 34
THIRD WORLD Q., 800, 811 (2013) (“[V]ictims can disagree with the work of the
ICC, as they feel it provides symbolic justice, it is biased, it does not provide
protection, it does not provide justice as they understand it, and it does not
address their needs. . . . Victims are often reluctant to testify to the ICC for
fear of further attack. Victims could prefer local justice systems to justice meted out by an international court.”). Additionally, some argue that domestic
truth commissions may be preferable to prosecution under the ICC when the
goal is rebuilding the state. See, e.g., Charles Villa-Vicencio, Why Perpetrators
Should Not Always Be Prosecuted: Where the International Criminal Court
and Truth Commissions Meet, 49 EMORY L.J. 205, 215–20 (2000). While these
topics are beyond the scope of this Note, it is crucial to remember these con-
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bring crimes committed against the LGBT community in front
of the ICC. The result of such an explicit policy by OTP is that
the debate over whether or not persecutors of the LGBT community are subject to criminal investigation and prosecution
under the Rome Statute will end and then, and only then, will
the ICC be empowered to punish such offenders. Many gay and
lesbian individuals throughout the world suffer persecution on
a daily basis at the hands of the state and private individuals
196
uncontrolled by the government. Those individuals should not
be made to continue to suffer in silence before the ICC; rather,
their hardships should be acknowledged and their persecutors
should be brought to justice when governments are unwilling or
unable to act. The ICC does not need to restructure itself in order to address this problem because it already has all the necessary requisites to protect the LGBT community. All that is
needed is action within the bounds of the power of OTP and
ICC, and such a step is required by the Rome Statute, international law, and justice.
C. OTP ADOPTING SUCH A POLICY WOULD NOT VIOLATE THE
TREATY NOR THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SIGNATORY STATES
While the proposed language may certainly be promulgated by OTP, some may argue that such language would not only
constitute a “bait and switch” but would also violate both the
sovereignty of member states and the structure of the ICC.
This Section addresses both of those arguments and concludes
that they are not sufficient to defeat this proposal.
The first argument that critics of this proposal may suggest is that signatories to the original language did not agree to
this “new” interpretation. However, this is not the case; signatories agreed to the ambiguous language found within the treaty, fully aware that such language could be interpreted multiple ways. Additionally, these signatories agreed to abide by
international human rights standards, which, as has been discussed above, support such a reading.
Yet another, seemingly more legitimate, counterargument
to this proposal stems from the concept that the signatory
states have not sacrificed their sovereignty in signing the Rome
Statute; rather than the ICC manufacturing the norms with

siderations while noting that such an interpretation by OTP may not lead to
immediate prosecution.
196. See supra Part I.A.
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which such states must comply, the ICC should simply enforce
violations of norms already in place at the national level. This
sort of criticism could be seen as a “bottom-up” approach: the
norms ought to come from the states themselves and the ICC
simply has the role of enforcing those norms. However, such a
criticism ignores the primary role of the ICC: to supplement the
judiciary efforts of states when those states have failed to act in
accordance with international human rights norms. In such a
system, the norms are indeed coming from the “bottom-up” because the violations of those norms on the ground in the signatory states is what is creating the need for the ICC to act.
Member states are indeed identifying the areas in which the
ICC must act by failing to protect the rights of certain groups.
D. DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW GENERALLY
INDICATE A MOVEMENT TOWARD PROTECTING THE LGBT
COMMUNITY AND THE ICC SHOULD FOLLOW THIS TREND
Such a reading of the Rome Statute would be consistent
with trends in international law, a consideration that is required both by logic and the Rome Statute itself. Individual
countries and the international community as a whole have
seen changes in their respective approaches to LGBT rights
such that the ICC would not be blazing a new, unexplored
197
trail. The ECHR has acknowledged that the LGBT communi198
ty is a group in need of protection and that doing so is proper.
Its view is that international law’s developments and a changing view of the rights of the LGBT community have had a profound impact on the ICC and its treatment of disparate treat199
ment on the basis of sexual orientation. The rights of the
LGBT community, once ignored as an international problem,
has taken hold in the international community and has been
200
recognized in various parts of the world. While LGBT rights
may once have been “subject to easy change by shifting majorities” because of a disjointed world community view on this
group, history has taught the international community that the
rights of homosexuals and transgendered individuals “are so

197. See supra Part I.F; see also Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(3)
(“The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be
consistent with internationally recognized human rights . . . .”).
198. See JOHNSON, supra note 111.
199. See id.
200. See supra Part I.F.
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essential that [they ought to be] entrench[ed]” in the interna201
tional community and the ICC itself.
Although there has been change, more is needed to stop
the crimes that are currently being perpetrated against members of the LGBT community. The international community at
large has made strides, but there are others within the com202
munity that refuse to acknowledge the rights of this group.
The ICC may in fact play an important role in deterring these
203
crimes as it has the ability to bring many of those offenders
under its jurisdiction. The international community has not yet
demonstrated a willingness to universally recognize this group
and this alone shows how crucial it is that the ICC intervene.
As has been demonstrated, not only does the ICC have the ability to do so, it must do so in order to fulfill its mandate and protect this distinct group.
CONCLUSION
The LGBT community has been the target of crimes
against humanity and the world community’s reluctance to
acknowledge this group’s rights in the ICC is complicit in their
persecution. OTP has made several suggestions that it may be
willing to consider the LGBT community to fall under the definition of “gender,” yet that definition has sparked intense debate since it was first introduced into the Rome Statute. However, the attitudes of the international community have been
moving toward recognition that the rights of the LGBT community must be realized under human rights law. The practices of the ECHR and IACHR demonstrate that this population
has been protected by human rights courts and those courts’
methodology can be utilized by the ICC.
This Note suggests that the language of the Rome Statute
itself does not need revision; rather, what is needed is an explicit policy by OTP recognizing that members of the LGBT
community qualify as a protected group under the Rome Statute’s definition of “gender.” Such a policy aligns the obligations
201. See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, RIGHTS FROM WRONGS 81 (2004) (arguing that
the establishment of a right comes not from natural sources, but from history’s
lessons on what is and is not proper).
202. See, e.g., supra Part I.A.; supra Part II.B.2.
203. See Kevin Burke, The Deterrent Effect of the International Criminal
Court, CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL SOLUTIONS (Mar. 2, 2015), http://globalsolutions
.org/blog/2015/03/Deterrent-Effect-International-Criminal-Court#.Vv7RJ
-IrLX4.
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of the ICC with the realities of both the international community in general and also the practices of human rights courts. By
embracing the ambiguity employed by the drafters of the Rome
Statute and adopting the propriety of other international
courts, the ICC can see a path before it wherein crimes of persecution directed at the LGBT community will be punished accordingly. Such an understanding of the definition of “gender,”
especially when acknowledged explicitly by OTP, will be the
first move towards protecting vulnerable LGBT communities
under the Rome Statute.

